



## Environmental Institutions Seminar Series

Presents two seminars by

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University of London

# The Incidence of International Agreements: Do Latecomers Lose Out?

**Wednesday, April 13, 2005**

**12:30 pm – 2:00 pm**

**Room A158 Levine Science Research Center, Research Drive, Duke University**

### Abstract

The maintenance of an international public good, such as the ozone layer, is often pursued by means of the imposition of a uniform global standard (such as the global ban on CFCs implemented under the Montreal Protocol). Many argue that uniform standards discriminate against the latecomers to development, since early adopters of the technology generate the emissions that cause the environmental problem while late adopters experience the same penalty with none of the earlier benefits.

Others argue that latecomers benefit from technological changes that have occurred in the interim, and so do not incur the cost of change from disallowed technologies. This paper attempts to develop an objective framework for assessing the costs of such uniform standards in the context of technological change. We formulate the principle of “development-based reciprocity”: each country being held to the same level of contribution at the same level of development. The principle is shown to give concrete results in ascertaining the physical incidence of a uniform standard across heterogeneous countries, and provides a baseline for the examination of the critical issues regarding the valuation of the incidence of such standards within the context of technological change.

### Biography

Professor Tim Swanson holds the Chair of Law & Economics at University of London. His JD was acquired from Michigan in 1982 and his Ph.D. from London School of Economics in 1991. He taught in the department of economics in Cambridge University for ten years prior to moving to the faculty of law in London in 1998. He has written extensively on issues to do with international institution building and global resources (especially the conservation of biological diversity). He has advised UNEP, IUCN and many other organizations on issues to do with incentives and burden-sharing in international institutions. He has published a volume on the issue entitled *Global Environmental Problems and International Environmental Agreements* (Edward Elgar 2001).



*Also:*

## Investigations into Western Wildlife Conservation Preferences: Willingness to Pay to Conserve Giant Pandas and Black Rhinoceros

**Thursday, April 14, 2005**

**10:30 am – 11:30 am**

**Room A312**

Levine Science Research Center

### Abstract:

In terms of effective demand, the single largest component of value for wildlife species in developing countries often is the non-use value held by westerners in countries far away. In a series of case studies we have investigated the nature of Western preferences, and the extent to which Western values might be channeled toward the conservation of the wildlife species, and of biodiversity generally, in the host state. Swanson's analysis is based on the Black Rhino Conservation Programme in Namibia and the Wolong Panda Conservation Center near Sichaun, China.

The full abstract is available on  
the CES seminar webpage.

Please RSVP by April 11, 2005 to Duke Center for Environmental Solutions: [leithc@duke.edu](mailto:leithc@duke.edu), or 613-8131  
For directions to seminar locations, visit our website: <http://www.env.duke.edu/solutions/>